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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE 0^ UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890583-CA
Priority No. 2

RICKY PALMER,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Appellant relies on his opening brief and refers this Court
to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, the issues, and
the case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State is correct that Mr. Palmer was placed under
arrest and given his Miranda warnings prior to being x-rayed.

The

first sentence in the second full paragraph of the fact statement on
page 6 of Appellant's opening brief should be amended to read:

"The

officers transported Mr. Palmer to the Salt Lake County Jail and
placed him in an isolation cell."
Mr. Palmer takes issue with the State's claim that "Mayo's
testimony is most fairly interpreted as indicating that a warrant
could be obtained in no less than two hours." Appellee's Brief at
4.

Sergeant Mayo actually testified that "[t]hey have sped up the

procedure [for obtaining telephonic warrants]" and that he assumed
he could obtain one "within two hours." T 40-1. See Addendum A for

transcript of testimony at issue.
This Court's determination of the issues raised in this
case is a mixed question of law and fact.

Although Mr. Palmer did

not specifically attack the trial court's factual determinations in
his opening brief, to the extent that such factual determinations
are "clearly erroneous," they must be discarded by this Court in
assessing the legal conclusions.

See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326

(Utah App. 1989), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989). 1

An

example of one such "clearly erroneous" finding is the trial court's
determination that "it would have taken a minimum of two hours to
obtain a search warrant."

T 77. As set forth above, Sgt. Mayo

testified that he could have obtained a search warrant within two
hours.

T 40-1. This testimony establishes that it would have taken

a maximum of two hours to obtain a warrant.
Other than the clarifications set forth above, Appellant
relies on the Statement of Facts contained in his opening brief at
2-6.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defense counsel relied heavily on Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), in his argument in the trial court and argued
all three prongs of the Schmerber test.

1

He presented evidence that

In the statements made by the trial court and attached
as an addendum to the State's brief, the trial judge appears for the
most part to be reiterating testimony rather than making formal
findings.

- 2

-

the test was not a reasonable method nor done in a reasonable
manner.

The State responded to the reasonable means argument by

arguing that the x-ray was a reasonable method done in a reasonable
manner.

The trial court ruled on the prong.

Under such

circumstances, the State's position that Appellant failed to
preserve his argument that the x-ray was not conducted in a
reasonable manner is without merit.
The State concedes that the trial court's depiction of
exigent circumstances is "unique" but asks this Court to expand the
concept beyond its traditional confines.
rationale for such an expansion.

The State offers no

The exigent circumstances

rationale would swallow the rule if expanded to this situation.
The inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable to the
circumstances of this case. An independent investigation which
would have led to the recovery of the ring was not in place when the
x-ray was taken, nor would routine procedures at the jail have led
to the discovery.

Applying the doctrine under these circumstances

would widen the exception to cover almost any search.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE WARRANTLESS X-RAY OF APPELLANT
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
The State agrees that taking an x-ray is the type of bodily
intrusion to which the fourth amendment is applicable and that the
analysis set forth in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
is applicable to the instant case. Appellee's Brief at 5-6.

- 3
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A. X-RAYING MR. PALMER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE WAS NOT A REASONABLE METHOD NOR WAS IT
DONE IN A REASONABLE MANNER.
Although the State has chosen not to respond directly to
Mr. Palmer's argument regarding this prong of the Schmerber test,
the State's lack of response by no means removes this issue from
this Court's review.

See Appellee's Brief at 6.

As Mr. Palmer set

forth in his opening brief at 10, 12 and 21, one of the three prongs
of the Schmerber test requires that the method chosen be reasonable
and that the test be conducted in a reasonable manner.

The State

agrees that Schmerber is applicable to the instant case and agrees
that this prong is one aspect of the Schmerber test.

Despite the

fact that Appellant relied extensively on Schmerber in the trial
court, presented evidence of the unreasonable method and manner of
conducting the x-ray to the trial court, specifically addressed that
prong in argument, albeit briefly, and received a ruling from the
trial judge as to that prong, the State refused to respond directly
to the serious claims raised by Mr. Palmer regarding the procedure
utilized, claiming instead that the argument regarding this prong is
expanded on appeal, was not raised in the trial court, and should
not be considered by this Court.
Although the State's waiver argument has no basis in the
context of this case, Mr. Palmer is compelled to briefly address it.
First, defense counsel extensively relied on Schmerber and
the three-prong test set forth therein.

T 63. He specifically

articulated the reasonable method and manner test.

- 4

-

The first is the [methods] used to effectuate the
search must be reasonable. In Schmerber, there was
a blood test, hospital conditions, that sort of
thing. I would simply submit it on the evidence
presented.
T 63.

Defense counsel had already presented evidence that x-rays

were dangerous.

T 53-54.

He had also presented evidence that

Appellant was physically restrained, pinned against a wall by three
officers, grabbed at the throat by one officer while the other two
held him, moved him toward the table, and physically held him down
on the table while he struggled to get away.

T 51-3.2

In the interest of saving time, avoiding repetition, and
not belaboring the obvious, lawyers often raise an issue for a trial
or appellate court, then submit it on the evidence, briefs or
argument already presented.

Submission of an issue does not mean,

as the State seems to contend, that the lawyer concedes the issue
doe not have merit, is waived, or even that it is weak.

It simply

means that counsel will not present further argument on that issue

2

In responding to defense counsel's argument regarding
this prong of the Schmerber test, the prosecutor stated:
First of all, the reasonable methods have been
used. I submit that in the medical environment, the
doctor looking at him first . . .

I think the x-ray is a reasonable method to be
used. There is no giving of Ipecac syrup making him
regurgitate. That is a - elation, I think, of due
process. I think the Cc
Is about that. That is
unreasonable but an x-rc
3 a minimal intrusion.
T 69. Hence, the prosecutor addressed both the manner and method
employed.

- 5
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and will submit it to the Court for the Court's decision.
If this Court were to accept the State's argument that the
issue is waived in this context, trial courts will be deluged with
endless arguments from counsel who is worried he or she has not said
enough.

The State's argument that trial counsel did not elaborate

enough to preserve his argument ignores the practical realities of
the trial court where, at times, an issue has been fully presented
and the judge is eager to move on; a wise lawyer will submit his
issue under such circumstances.
The State relies on State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah 1985), for its position that this Court should not consider
the argument as to this prong.

Carter is easily distinguishable

from the instant case.
In Carter, the defendant argued in the trial court that the
officers did not have grounds to frisk him because there were not
reasonable grounds to believe he was armed and dangerous.
at 659.

707 P.2d

On appeal, the defendant raised the additional argument,

which had not been mentioned in the trial court, that the
warrantless search of his backpack was invalid because it was not
done incident to arrest.

This second argument required a different

legal analysis and a focus on different facts than the first
argument.
By contrast, as the State points out in its brief (State's
Brief at 1), "[t]he sole issue" presented in this case is whether
the x-ray search was unlawful, requiring suppression of the ring and
x-ray.

Counsel relied on Schmerber and raised the issue regarding

- 6
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this prong.

This was sufficient to preserve the issue.

In addition to counsel adequately raising the issue, the
trial judge issued a ruling on this prong.

T 79-80. While it might

be appropriate in some circumstances to find waiver where the trial
judge has not had an opportunity to analyze the facts and law
regarding a certain issue, where a trial judge has in fact had such
an opportunity and actually issued an order, no rationale for
finding waiver exists.
On appeal, counsel for Mr. Palmer simply developed an
argument which had been raised in the trial court.

Although the

opening brief broke the issue down into two subcategories—
(1) whether the method itself was reasonable and (2) whether the
manner in which it was conducted was reasonable—the two
subcategories actually make up one prong of the Schmerber test.
This prong was raised, and evidence was introduced and submitted;
the issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal.3

B. TRADITIONAL EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT EXIST
IN THIS CASE AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE
EXCEPTION FOR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
The State acknowledges in its brief at 12 that the facts in
this case do not fall within the realm of traditional exigent
circumstances.

The State points out that "[t]his is so because the

3

Mr. Palmer refers this Court to his opening bri^f at
21-26 for his substantive argument as to the serious violate n which
occurred in this case when a bodily intrusion search was conducted
in an unreasonable manner by an unreasonable method.

- 7

exigent circumstances identified by the trial court involve the
possible destruction or concealment of evidence not necessarily
thought to be in the place to be searched—i.e., the interior of the
defendant's body."

State's Brief at 12-13.

The State acknowledges further that the rationale in
People v. Williams. 510 N.E.2d 445 (111. App. 1987), regarding what
constitutes exigent circumstances is "unique" and that the question
of whether exigent circumstances existed in this case "is admittedly
a close one" (State's Brief at 14, 15) but asks this Court to expand
the concept of exigent circumstances beyond its traditional scope to
include the circumstances of this case.
The State, however, offers no rationale in support of such
an expansion, other than the argument that a single appellate court
in Illinois expanded the concept in such a fashion.

This is not

sufficient to demonstrate the appropriateness of widening the
concept beyond its traditional confines.

In addition, it fails to

address the concerns articulated by Mr. Palmer in his opening brief
at 15-16 that such an expansion of the concept of exigent
circumstances would swallow the rule and lead to a finding of
exigent circumstances in almost every search.4
In State v. Larocco, Case No. 870412 (filed May 30, 1990),

4

In United States v. Gorski, 582 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir.
1988) (cited by the State on page 18 of its brief), the Court stated:
Exigent circumstances are one of the few "jealously
and carefully drawn" exceptions to the need for a
search warrant.

- 8
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the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the importance of simplifying
search and seizure rules,

Larocco, slip OP. at 15. The Court

further emphasized that Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution
requires a warrant unless traditional exigent circumstances exist.
The Court stated, "warrantless searches will be permitted only where
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect the
safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of
evidence [citation omitted]."

Larocco, slip op. at 16. The Court

continued by quoting Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion in
State v. Hvqh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985):
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the
officers with concealed weapons or will destroy
evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why
the officers cannot take the time to secure a
warrant. Such a requirement would present little
impediment to police investigations, especially in
light of the ease with which warrants can be
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute,
U.C.A., 1953, § 7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.).
Larocco. slip op. at 16.
In the face of the Utah Supreme Court's recent attempt to
simplify search and seizure law and its restriction of exigent
circumstances to the "traditional justification," there is no basis
for this Court to expand the concept of exigent circumstances to fit
the circumstances of the present case.

C. THERE WAS NOT A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE RING
WOULD BE FOUND INSIDE MR. PALMER.
Mr. Palmers argument regarding this prong of the Schmerber
test is adequately argued in Appellant's opening brief at 18-21.
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POINT II. THE "INEVITABLE DISCOVERY11 ARGUMENT DOES
NOT MAKE THIS OTHERWISE ILLEGAL SEARCH LAWFUL.
In his arguments in the trial court, the prosecutor focused
on exigent circumstances as "what this case hinges on."

T 69.

Without developing any argument or citing any case law, the
prosecutor did briefly state that "there is almost an inevitability
of discovery."

T 71. The trial court did not address the

inevitable discovery argument in its ruling.
On appeal, the State contends that the officers would have
inevitably discovered the ring and that even if this Court deems the
search illegal, the evidence nevertheless would be admissible.
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court refused to suppress evidence which was obtained in
violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel,
reasoning that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered.
The Court reached its decision by relying on the facts in the record
which established that search parties were already looking for the
body and had approached the actual location of the body.

Nix, 467

U.S. at 391. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent,
the Court concludes that unconstitutionally obtained
evidence may be admitted at trial if it inevitably
would have been discovered in the same condition by
an independent line of investigation that was
already being pursued when the constitutional
violation occurred.
Id. at 459 (emphasis added).

Justice Stevens, in his concurrence,

also focused on the necessity of having the independent line of
investigation in place for the inevitable discovery doctrine to
apply.

- 10 -

The majority is correct to insist that any rule of
exclusion not provide the authorities with an
incentive to commit violations of the Constitution.
Ante, at 445-446, 81 L Ed 2d, at 388-389. If the
inevitable discovery rule provided such an incentive
by permitting the prosecution to avoid the
uncertainties inherent in its search for evidence it
would undermine the constitutional guarantee itself,
and therefore be inconsistent with the deterrent
purposes of the exclusionary rule [footnote
omitted]. But when the burden of proof on the
inevitable discovery question is placed on the
prosecution, ante, at 444, 81 L Ed 2d, at 387-388,
it must bear the risk of error in the determination
made necessary by its constitutional violation. The
uncertainty as to whether the body would have been
discovered can be resolved in its favor here only
because, as the Court explains ante, at 448-450, 81
L Ed 2d, at 390-391 petitioner adduced evidence
demonstrating that at the time of the constitutional
violation an investigation was already under way
which, in the natural and probable course of events,
would have soon discovered the body.
Id. at 456-7 (emphasis added).

Hence, although in Nix v. Williams

the Court did not articulate the precise parameters of the
inevitable discovery doctrine, it did require that an independent
line of investigation be in place at the time the constitutional
violation occurred.
Various commentators and courts have criticized the
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine and cautioned that
it must be strictly applied so that police misconduct will not be
sanctioned and the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule can
remain effective.

See 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.4(a) at

381-3 (2d ed. 1987).
As LaFave notes:
As one commentator put it:
Such a rule is completely at odds with the purpose
of the exclusionary rule. If the police will only

- 11 -

be deprived of that evidence which the defendant can
show they would not have been able to obtain had
they not engaged in the illegality, they will in no
way be deterred from such conduct; all they will
stand to lose is what they would not have otherwise
had and they might gain some advantage if something
slips by. Moreover, the illegal route is often
faster and easier than the legally required route
[footnote omitted].
Id. at 381.

LaFave agrees that the concerns are legitimate but

believes that the argument is "directed not so much to the rule
itself as to its application in a loose and unthinking fashion."

In

his discussion of the appropriate application of the rule, LaFave
suggests that the rule should be applied in a manner so as not to
encourage "unconstitutional shortcuts" and that courts should be
"extremely careful not to apply the 'inevitable discovery' rule upon
the basis of nothing more than a hunch or speculation as to what
otherwise might have occurred."

Id. at 383.

Various courts have ruled that the inevitable discovery
doctrine is not applicable "where its use would, as a practical
matter, operate to nullify important Fourth Amendment safeguards."
LaFave Supp. p.31.

In People v. Knapp, 422 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. App.

1981), decided prior to Nix, the Court refused to find that the
evidence would have inevitably been discovered, pointing out that if
it were to apply in that case,
[E]very warrantless nonexigent seizure automatically
would be legitimatized by assuming the hypothetical
alternative that a warrant had been obtained.
In Commonwealth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d 818 (Mass. 1981), the
Court "declinedfd] to apply the rule in a situation where its effect
would be to read out of the Constitution the requirement that the

- 12 -

police follow certain protective procedures—in this case, the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 823.

[citation omitted].11

See also State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D.

1981) ("If the inevitable discovery theory applied when a short cut
was taken, . . . the net result would be that the magistrate's
determination of probable cause as required by the fourth amendment
would be eliminated for all practical purposes.11).
In the present case, application of the inevitable
discovery rule would serve to "nullify important Fourth Amendment
safeguards" and encourage "unconstitutional shortcuts."

In all

cases where officers seek to do a bodily intrusion search of an
in-custody defendant, the State could argue that the person could
have been placed in an isolation cell and the evidence eventually
obtained.

Allowing officers to use evidence obtained from a bodily

intrusion search where the kicking defendant was held down on the
table would completely undermine the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rule.

In the future, officers would commit the

unconstitutional bodily intrusion because it was faster and easier
than placing the defendant in isolation or obtaining a warrant, then
argue for admission of the evidence saying "we would have done it
the right way and gotten the evidence anyway."

The deterrence

rationale requires that the inevitable discovery doctrine not be
applied in this case.
Where the rule is applicable, Nix v. Williams appears to
limit relief under the rule only to situations where an independent
investigation which was already in place would have led to the

- 13 -

discovery of the evidence.

Nix, 467 U.S. at 445-6, 456-7, 459. In

United States v. Satterfield. 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984),
the Court pointed out that "if evidence is obtained by illegal
conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the police possessed
and were pursuing lawful means of discovery at the time the
illegality occurred" (emphasis added).

The Court noted that this

requirement is "sound" because "a valid search warrant nearly always
can be obtained after the search has occurred, [and] a contrary
holding would practically destroy "the warrant requirement."
Since Nix was decided, both the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal have extended the rule to include a requirement
that either an independent investigation is in place or invariable,
routine procedures would have unearthed the evidence.

See United

States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986) ("routine
booking procedure and inventory would have inevitably resulted in
discovery of cocaine"); United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696
(2d Cir. 1988) (discovery not inevitable since the "record reveals
no evidence that [inventory] searches were an invariable, routine
procedure in the booking and detention of a suspect at the
particular FBI office involved"); United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval,
872 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]his circuit does not
require that the evidence be obtained from a previously initiated,
independent investigation.

[citation omitted].

The government can

meet its burden by establishing that, by following routine
procedures, the police would inevitably have uncovered the
evidence.

[citation omitted].").

14 -

In Ramirez-Sandoval, the Court focused on the evidence
which was present in the district court and held that although the
officer could have questioned the individuals in the van, the
government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have done so.

The Court pointed out that the officer's

testimony contained "no suggestion that he intended to question the
occupants of the van, and no evidence to that effect was introduced
in the hearing."

872 F.2d at 1400.

See also LaFave at 384 ("The

significance of the word 'would' cannot be overemphasized.

It is

not enough to show that the evidence 'might' or 'could' have been
otherwise obtained.

Once the illegal act is shown to have been in

fact the sole effective cause of the discovery of certain evidence,
such evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution severs the
causal connection by an affirmative showing that it would have
acquired the evidence in any event.

In order to avoid the

exclusionary rule, the government must establish that it has not
benefitted by the illegal acts of its agents; a showing that it
might not have so benefitted is insufficient.").
The State contends that Mr. Palmer "effectively concedes"
that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by arguing
in his opening brief that officers could have placed him in
isolation.

The fact that officers could have placed Mr. Palmer in

isolation does not mean they would have, and Mr. Palmer by no means
conceded this point in his opening brief.
In the present case, when the officers x-rayed Mr. Palmer,
an independent investigation which would have recovered the evidence

- 15 -

was not in place.

Sergeant Mayo telephoned the jail to find out

whether the jail had the capability of keeping Mr. Palmer under
surveillance and recovering the ring if it passed in feces.
32.

T 28,

As a result of the phone call, Sgt. Mayo apparently ascertained

that the jail did not have such a capability.

T 34-5. Although the

jail could place Mr. Palmer in isolation, it could not provide
personnel to keep him under surveillance.

T 31-3. Sergeant Mayo

was concerned that if Mr. Palmer were not under surveillance, he
could repeatedly pass and reingest the ring.

T 34. He apparently

therefore did not consider placing Mr. Palmer in isolation as an
option.

T 34-5.
This testimony establishes that the officers had not taken

independent steps to obtain the ring by placing Mr. Palmer in
isolation.

Although Sgt. Mayo could have provided one of his men to

observe Mr. Palmer, the Sergeant's testimony does not indicate any
attempts or even thoughts of doing so.

The State failed to

establish that an independent investigation was underway; in fact,
all of the testimony demonstrates that no such independent
investigation was underway or intended unless a positive result was
obtained from the x-ray.
Nor did the State introduce any evidence which would
support a determination that isolation and surveillance were an
invariable routine process.

In fact, Sgt. Mayo's testimony

demonstrates the opposite—that the jail did not have the capability
to carry out the procedure and did not routinely isolate suspects.
See T 28, 32.

- 16 -

The only reason the State ultimately placed Mr. Palmer in
isolation is because the illegal x-ray located the ring.

As the

Court pointed out in People v. Knapp. 422 N.E.2d at 536, where the
subsequent recovery of the evidence is triggered by or the fruit of
the illegal search, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not
apply.

See also United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval. 872 F.2d at

1396, quoting United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864-5 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("This doctrine requires that 'the fact or likelihood
that makes the discovery inevitable arise from circumstances other
than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.'11).
In this case, officers made no other effort to obtain the
ring and made the decision to isolate Mr. Palmer only after they
were certain, as the result of the illegal search, that the ring
would be found inside of him.

Applying the rule in this case would

encourage constitutional shortcuts and swallow the warrant
requirement.

The decision to isolate Mr. Palmer was the fruit of

the illegal search.

Because no independent investigation was

underway and routine procedures would not have led to the discovery,
allowing the inevitable discovery to "save" the illegal search in
this case would nullify the fourth amendment requirements.
The fourth amendment was violated in this case, and the
evidence seized should be excluded.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand his case for a new trial absent the
illegally seized evidence.
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ADDENDUM A

1

A

It was possible. We were going under the

2

degree of conviction that the Sears people had, that

3

Mr. Palmer was working alone.

4

Q

They are not police officers?

5

A

No.

6

Q

What is a telephonic search warrant?

7

A

It's a search warrant with the authorization to

8

conduct the search.

9

by the use of a telephone.

10
11

Q

It is obtained through a magistrate

When you called the County Attorney's Office,

did they advise you to get a telephonic search warrant?

12

A

No, they did not.

13

Q

Did they discuss that option at all?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And they told you, you didn't need one?

16

A

Yes, that is correct.

17

Q

That you didn't need a telephonic search

18

warrant?

19

A

Right.

20

Q

How long does it take to get a telephonic

21
22

search warrant?
A

They have sped up the procedure to some degree.

23

If I had gone through Metro Narcotics, a procedure which

24

is fairly quickly, it would have taken me longer to find

25

someone in Metro Narcotics to open up their facility for
40

me, that probably for me to get the search warrant, I was
probably looking at a couple of hours.
Q

You could obtain a search warrant within two

hours?
A

I would assume so.

Q

And when you say a search warrant, you mean a

written search warrant with a Judge's signature?
A

As I say, it would have taken me about the same

period of time to do either one.
Q

So, a telephonic search warrant may be quicker

and a regular, written search warrant within two hours?
A

Yes. When I was in narcotics, I was able to

start the procedure for a search warrant.

I think I

could get one in two or three hours.
Q

This is a Tuesday at 6:30 p.m., that we are

talking about.
A

I don't recall the day, but it was May 3rd

about that period of time.
Q

And that is not a difficult time to get a

warrant either, is it?
A

I mean, during the day?

It is certainly more difficult than if it had

been 11 o'clock in the morning.
Q

Certainly.

But still the two hours is a

reasonable amount of time?
A

I would think so.
41

